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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JONATHAN ROBERT WEBER, by and
through his guardians and
conservators, DONALD R. WEBER
and WINONA WEBER, and DONALD
R. WEBER and WINONA WEBER,
individually,
Plaintiff-Appellants,
vs.

Case No. 59,146

SPRINGVILLE CITY, SPRINGVILLE
IRRIGATION COMPANY, THOMAS W.
BIESINGER, and JOHN DOES I
through V,
Defendants-Respondents.
BRIEF SUBMITTED ON BEHALF
OF THE APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action against a landlord for negligence and
breach of contract for failure to adequately maintain a fence,
gate and common area whichwere represented to adequately protect small children living in his apartment complex
Hobble Creek and structures related thereto.

from

It is also a

negligence action against the irrigation district, and city,
relating to creation and maintenance of an attractive nuisance
and failure to protect the 2 and 1/2 year old plaintiff from
the dangers therein.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN THE LOWER COURT
Prior to trial,

the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah

County granted defendants' motions for summary judgment"

NATURE OF THE RELIEF SOUGHT
Plaintiffs move the court to reverse the orders of the
Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County which granted
defendants' motions for summary judgment.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The case before the court relates to certain real property
and structures erected thereon which are located in Springville
City, Utah County, State of Utah.

A survey of the property is

part of the record on appeal (R. 478).

A copy of a portion of

the survey is included herewith as the next page (p. 3) of
this brief.
The building designated as the apartment complex is the
building owned by defendant Biesinger at the time of plaintiff
Jonathan Weber's injuries.

Donald and Winona Weber were

unloading their belongings and transferring

them to apartment

number 36 which they had rented from defendant Biesinger.
529).

(R.

Donald Weber had parked the vehicle containing his

family's belongings in the parking lot near the southeast
corner of the apartment complex (R. 569, depo. of Donald Weber
p.

16).
The dam,

the bridges located above the dam and other

related structures were erected and maintained by defendants
Springville Irrigation Company and Springville City as more
specifically set forth at a later point in this Statement of
r acts ( p. 6 ) .
In 1975, defendant Biesinger constructed the fence depicted in the survey to protect the small children living in the
-2-

I

SWENSON

LANE

Note:
1)

Bridge is located on Seventh East just
North of its junction with Swensen Avenue.

2)

The dam of the Springville Irrigation Company
is located directly east and adjacent to the
bridge on Seventh East.
The head gates and
control wheels of the dam are accessed by a
foot path and walkway over the diversion
structure which attaches to the bridge.

apartment complex from the danger of the constantly running
irrigation ditch on the adjacent property.
Biesinger p. 8).

(R. 574, depo. of

The fence which defendant Biesinger con-

structed connected with the neighboring chain link fence on
the west end.
east end,

(R. 571, depo. of Gene Wing p. 21).

however,

On the

the fence ended near the bridge,

leaving a

space through which people could pass; there was no side
fence.

(R. 571

depo. of Gene Wing p. 57).

Hobble Creek,

just

40 feet farther from his property in some places than the
irrigation ditch,
of the year.

is full of water and dangerous during part

(R. 574, depo. of Biesinger p. 8).

After the

irrigation ditch was covered defendant Biesinger felt the
value of the fence had diminished, and therefore, the gate on
the west end was not maintained, and the fence had been
allowed to develop holes through which children passed.

(R.

574, depo. of Biesinger, p. 9, 24, 31)
Shortly before the 13th of June, 1980, plaintiffs answered defendant Biesinger's advertisement for an apartment for
rent.

They were shown the apartment by agents of defendant

Biesinger purporting to be the managers.

Plaintiffs became

concerned when they heard the sound of running water in nearby
Hobble Creek.

(R. 569, depo. of Don Weber p. 10, 11, 12).

In

the interest of the safety of their 2 1/2 year old son,
Jonathan Weber, the plaintiffs specifically asked whether the
common area was safe for children to play in and whether small
children could gain access to the stream.
Don Weber p. 10, 11,

12)

(R. 569, depo. of

Plaintiffs were reassured by defen-4-

dant Biesinger's agents that the common area was safe,

that a

proper and sufficient gate and fence had been placed to the
rear of the property, and that children could not get to the
stream.

(R. 569, depo. of Don Weher p.

10,

11.

12)

Plaintiffs relied upon the representations of defendant
Biesinger's agents and entered into a rental agreement with
defendant Biesinger for the lease of the premises (R.

529).

This lease agreement was signed by different agents of defendant Biesinger than those who first showed plaintiffs the
apartment.

(R. 569, depo. of Don Weber p.

dant Biesinger agreed,

10, 11, 12)

as a clause in the contract,

Defen-

to main-

tain both the interior and the exterior of the property in a
safe and operable condition (R.

529).

The fence described by defendant Biesinger's agents was,

in fact,

in substantial disrepair, and was wholly inadequate

to prevent access by small children to Hobble Creek (R.
356,

425,

426).

Additionally,

355,

the alleged gate in the descri-

bed fence did not exist and left an opening in the fence for
access to Hobble Creek (R.

355,

356, 425,

426).

On or about June 18, 1980, the plaintiffs were in the
process of moving into the Biesinger apartment building when
Jonathan Weber, age 2 1/2 years, gained access to Hobble Creek
from the CO!'l1Tlon area of the Biesinger apartment building (R.
7).

Jonathan Weber fell

into Hobble Creek and was rescued

from the creek a short time after the discovery of his absence,
but not before he sustained permanent debilitating physicial
and mental injuries (R.

7).

Jonathan Weber is presently a

-5-

spastic quadriplegic with severe brain damage which prevents
his normal development and which requires extensive attention
and significant expense for his maintenance (R. 7).
ThP following supplemental facts are necessary for the
cause of action against Springville Irrigation Company:
Springville Irrigation Company has the right to divert water
out of Hobble Creek for irrigation purposes.
of Hardy LeRoy Child p. 5).
constructed Swenson Dam.

(R. 569, depo.

Springville Irrigation Company

The dam is located directly east and

adjacent to the bridge and is part of the bridge structure.
(R. 134, 172).

Hobble Creek is used as an overflow channel to

release unused and unwanted irrigation water.
of Hardy LeRoy Child p. 9).

When all of the water is used for

irrigation purposes, Hobble Creek dries up.
Hardy LeRoy Child p. 9).

(R. 567, depo.

(R. 567, depo. of

The watermaster, Hardy LeRoy Child,

was aware that the children play at Swenson Dam in the summer
and was fearful about it.

(R. 567, depo. Hardy LeRoy Child p.

31).
These additional facts are necessary for the action against
Springville City:

Springville City performs maintenance each

year on the Hobble Creek waterway which lies within its
corporate boundaries.

The City has responsibility for main-

tenance of the bridge located at 700 East and 650 South (R.
573, depo. of Carl Curtis, p. 10).

The City has replaced

diversion structures, pipes and bridge decks at Swensen Dam
(R. 171, 172).

It also clears debris from the stream and

cleans the culverts (R. 570, depo. of Jack Windley, p. 11).
In addition to maintaining structures on and in Hobble Creek,
-6-

Springville City also shores up the banks and dredges certain
portions of the creek

(R.

573, rlepo. of L'arl Curtis, p.

16).

The city has assumed responsibility for the control of
water hazards on Hobble Creek.
within the city limits.

It repairs irrigation culverts

The Springville City ordinances refer

to impounded water as an "attractive nuisance"
City Ordinances §12-2-4,

(Springville

see Appendix"A").Although not

directly related to water hazards,

the City issues building

permits only upon compliance with regulatory provisions
promulgated for the public safety,

including the covering of

irrigations ditches (Springville City Ordinances §10-1-4,
see Appendix "B").
An irrigation waterway, running approximately parallel
to the Hobble Creek waterway,
dant Virginia B.

Law.

traverses the property of defen-

The irrigation waterway was covered to

eliminate the hazard which is presented to children.
of Biesinger p.

( Depo.

18)

ARGUMENT
POINT I

SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS A HARSH REMEDY, AND DEFENDANTS'
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED
WHEN SIGNIFICANT ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT EXIST.
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
as follows:
. the judgment sought shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, l f
any, show that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.

Defendants' motions for summary judgment should not be
granted because significant issues of material fact exist and
defendants are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The trial court,

in granting the motions for summary judgment,

ignored these essential principles of summary judgment analysis
under Utah law.
First, upon motion for summary judgment, the trial court
is required to consider all relevant facts and the reasonable
inferences in a light most favorable to the party against whom
the motion is made.

The Utah Supreme Court commented on this

issue in Controlled Receivables, Inc. v. Harman, 17 Utah 2d
420, 413 P.2d 807, 809 (1966):
A motion for summary judgment is a harsh
measure, and for this reason plaintiff's
contentions must be considered in a light
most to his advantage and all doubts resolved in favor of permitting him to go to
trial; and only if the whole matter is so
viewed, he could, nevertheless, establish
no right to recovery, should the motion be
granted.
For other numerous references made by the Court to this
proposition see, W.M. Barnes Co. v. Sohio Nat. Res. Co., 627
P.2d 56 (Utah 1981); Hughes v. Housely, 599 P.2d 1250 (1979);
Livingston Industries, Inc. v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 565
P.2d 1117, 1118 (Utah 1977); Foster v. Steed, 19 Utah 2d 435,
432 P.2d 60, 62 (1967).
Second,

if the facts and their reasonable inferences when

viewed in a light most favorable for the non-moving party are
in dispute, summary judgment is simply improper.
Co. v. Adams,

In Holbrook

542 P.2d 191 (Utah 1975), the Utah Supreme Court
-8-

stated:
It is not the purpose of the summary judgment procedure to judge the credibility of
the averments of the parties, or witnesses,
or the weight of the evidence.
Neither is
it to deny parties the right to a trial to
resolve disputed issues of fact.
Its purpose is to eliminate the time, trouble and
expense of trial when upon any view taken
of the facts as asserted by the party ruled
against, he would not be entitled to prevail.
Id. at 193.

See also, Peterson v. Fowler,

P.2d 523, 526 (1978); University Club v.
29 Utah 2d 1,

29 Utah 2d 386, 510

Invesco Holding Corp.,

504 P.2d 29, 31 (1972); Transamerica Title Ins. Co.

v. United Resources, Inc., 24 Utah 2d 346, 471 P.2d 165 (1970);
and Robinson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 22 Utah
2d 163, 540 P.2d 91,

92 (1969).

Under the above-stated principles of Utah law, plaintiffs
submit that the defendants' motions for summary judgment should
have been denied.

First,

if the facts and the reasonable

inferences are viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs, recovery is certainly possible.

Second, there are dis-

positive issues of fact which are in substantial dispute, as
are detailed in the following points of this brief.

Third,

this case is certainly not a "clear-cut" case for summary
judgment, and the plaintiffs should be allowed the opportunity
of "at least attempting to prove" their allegations.
Margetts,

571 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1979).
POINT I I

THERE ARE UNRESOLVED ISSUES OF MATERIAL
FACT AND THE DEFENDANT BIESINGER IS NOT
ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
-9-

Durham v.

Plaintiffs' cause of action against defendant Biesinger
is based on negligence and defendant's breach of contract.
The duty owed to plaintiffs by the defendant arises as a result
of defendant's actions in renting his apartment to plaintiffs
and from his affirmative representations, through his agents,
to the effect that small children were protected from the
adjacent hazard of Hobble Creek and its appurtenant structures.

As is demonstrated below, the facts in this case are

in dispute, and must be read in the light most favorable to
the plaintiffs.

Summary judgment is, therefore, not an appro-

priate means of resolving this matter.
A.

There Are Material Issues Of Fact Relating to Defendant

Biesinger's Contractual Assumption of A Duty To Jonathan Weber
Based Upon The Representations Of His Agents, Plaintiffs'
Reliance Upon Those Representations In Entering Into The
Contract, And The Meaning of the Relevant Contract Provisions.
Plaintiffs' depositions on file herewith clearly indicate
that representations were made to them by defendant Biesinger's
agents that there were numerous small children who played in
the common area of the apartment building, that the fence
which inhibited access to Hobble Creek had been erected and
was maintained for the purpose of preventing small children
from entering the stream, and that the common area was safe.
These representations were made at a time when the Webers were
attempting to decide whether or not to rent an apartment from
the defendant, and these representations were made as an
inducement for them to rent.

Plaintiffs relied on these
-10-

representations and but for the representations they would not
have entered into the rental contract.

The plaintiffs entered

into a lease contract with the defendant Biesinger.

As part

of his contractual obligation, defendant contracted to maintain both the interior and exterior of the premises in a safe
and operable condition.

(R. 529).

Plaintiffs have alleged by

affidavits that the fence at the rear of the common area of
the defendant Beisinger's apartments was in disrepair, without
a proper gate, and incapable of adequately protecting small
children from the adjacent hazard of Hobble Creek.
356, 425,

426).

(R. 355,

Therefore, defendant breached a material

clause of the contract.

Defendant argues that, on the basis

of the testimony of Gene Wing that the fence was in good
repair and did have a gate, he did not breach the contract (R.
502).

Plaintiff Don Weber indicated that these representations

were made by persons purporting to be managers.

Defendant

adraits that there was another couple besides the Wing's who
acted as managers during that time.
12).

(Depo. of Biesinger p.

Defendant Biesinger argues that the conversations should

be characterized with reference to a subsequent alleged conversation with Mrs. Wing.

(R. 500, 501)

If the Court views

the plaintiffs' contentions as set forth in their depositions
and affidavits in a light most favorable to them,

it is clear

that a material issue of fact exists as to the nature of the
representations made, and the obligations which defendant
contractually undertook.
Regardless of what route Jonathan took, the fact that he
-11-

got to Hobble Creek after being placed in the apartment commons,

indicates by itself that defendant misrepresented the

state of the apartment commons when he, through his agents,
represented that the children were safe and that access to
Hobble Creek was inhibited.
As indicated by the above discussion, there is a dispute
as to the material issues of fact concerning defendant's
contractual obligations and his breach thereof.
B.

There Is A Material Issue Of Fact As To Whether The

Defendant Biesinger's Conduct Constituted An Assumption Of A
Duty To Jonathan Weber.
Defendant Biesinger by his conduct and by his representations voluntarily assumed a duty.

When the apartment complex

was built defendant Biesinger constructed a fence with a gate
to protect the small children in the complex from the danger
of the running water in the irrigation ditch on the adjacent
property.

He recognized that Hobble Creek, just 40 feet

farther from his property, was also dangerous.
of Biesinger p. 8)

(R. 574 , depo.

Defendant Biesinger, however, allowed the

fence to develop holes through which children would pass and
did not maintain the gate.
2 4'

(R. 574, depo. of Biesinger p. 9,

31).

In the present case, the duty of defendant Biesinger is
established by the statements of his agents, the apartment
managers, to the Webers when they were looking at the apartments prior to moving in.

When they inquired about the

dangers of the creek to the rear of the property, the Webers
-12-

were told that children continually played in the back of the
property, that there was a protective fence between the yard
and Hobble Creek, and that there wasn't any worry of danger to
the children.

(Depo. of Don Weber pp. 10, 12)

With respect to the plaintiffs' position that the defendant Biesinger voluntarily assumed a duty to the plaintiffs,
the Federal Court for the District of Utah has ruled that if
the Utah Supreme Court were to consider the issue of good
samaritan liability they would adopt that theory of liability
as set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts §§323 and
324(A).

Barnson, et al. v. United States, 531 F.Supp. 614

(D.C. Utah 1982).

Those Restatement sections indicate that if

a party undertakes to perform an act, and third parties rely
on that undertaking, then the third parties may maintain a
cause of action against the good samaritan for negligently
performing the said undertaking.

In the present case, plain-

tiffs have alleged that the landlord undertook to construct a
fence and other structures to inhibit access to Hobble Creek,
and that they made representations to that effect to the
plaintiffs in order to induce them to rent from the defendant.
Plaintiffs' reliance on said representations has been alleged
and is justifiable under the circumstances.
There are material issues of fact raised by the depositions, affidavits and other matters on file relating to each
of the elements set forth by the restatement.
The facts of Herdt v. Koenig, 119 S.W. 56 (Mo. 1909) are
closely akin to the factB in the instant case.
-13-

A landlord

maintained a common yard behind a building which was used by
children living in the apartment and their friends as a play
area.

Immediately adjacent to the landlord's property was a

quarry, and the landlord had constructed a fence separating
the common yard from the quarry.

However, the fence was dan-

gerously constructed, and when one of the children leaned
against a board of the fence,

the top board loosened and

detached from the post, and the child fell into the quarry.
The defendant/landlord argued that since the quarry was on the
land of another, he was not liable for the child's injury.
The court disagreed saying:
. it is urged that the quarry in this
instance is not located upon the defendant's premises, and therefore no liability attaches to him on account thereof.
It is sufficient to say on this score
that, while the quarry was not upon the
defendant's premises, it was immediately
adjacent to and rendered the common yard
dangerous. This fact was recognized by
the defendant and all concerned.
In view
of the danger attending the situation, the
defendant had erected the fence referred
to, to the end of discharging his obligation to exercise reasonable care for the
safety of those rightfully upon the
premises.
Having erected a fence upon his
premises as a barrier to the attendant
dangers of the quarry, it, of course,
evolved upon him to exercise ordinary care
to maintain the fence reasonably safe for
the purpose.
Herdt v. Koenig, 119 S.W.
at 59.
When defendant Biesinger built the apartments, Hobble
Creek and the open irrigation ditch were close by and posed a
threat to the safety of the children in the complex.

Defendant

Riesinger recognized his duty at that time and constructed a
-14-

fence with a gate.

(Depo. of Biesinger p.

RI

It would be

difficult for defendant Biesinger to claim now that he could
not foresee the risk of harm to the small children when he
allowed the fence to deteriorate and did not replace the gate.
In fact,

he worried about the hole in the fence,

recognizing

that it had posed a threat to the safety of the small children.
(Depo. of Biesinger p.
C.

31)

There Is A Material Issue Of Fact As To Where Jonathan

Weber Fell Into Hobble Creek.
Jonathan Weber was an infant 2 1/2 years old when the
incident occurred.

His mother had placed him on the east lawn

of the apartment complex with some toys to play with.
Depo. of Gene Wayne Wing p.

12, 62)

(R. 571,

Mr. Wing was in front of

the complex watering the lawn, and Mrs. Wing was sitting on
the porch of her apartment at the west end of the complex, and
neither saw Jonathan go across the sidewalk in front of the
complex.
Therefore,

(R. 571, depo. of Gene Wayne Wing p.

62,

63,

64)

it is highly probable that Jonathan went into the

back of the complex.

He could also have gone up the hill to

the bridge on the east side of the complex, past the bridge to
the church parking lot, and then gone down to Hobble Creek
and fallen in, but considering the child's age, his lack of
familiarity with the surroundings, and the short time between
when he was missed and when he was rescued,

it is more proba-

ble that he went into the backyard, and either through a hole
or through the opening where the gate should have

along

the well-worn path to Hobble Creek. There is a genuine issue
of fact as to where he went

into the
-15-

Regardless of what route he took, the fact that he got to
Hobble Creek after being placed in the apartment commons,
indicates by itself the nature of the mispresentation to plaintiffs,

that the children were safe and that access to Hobble

Creek was inhibited.
D.

Public Policy Should Require That When A Businessman

Enters Into An Activity For Profit, And There Is A Known
Danger Close By, And There Is No One Else Who Will Make The
Venture Safe, And There Is An Economical And Feasible Way To
Make It Safe, He Has A Duty To Make It Safe.
Defendant Biesinger built the apartment complex in 1975
with the intention of renting to families with children.
Because of his profit motive he brought small children in
close proximity to a serious danger.
intervening property between that owned by defendant
Biesinger and Hobble Creek is a narrow strip of property owned
by the Laws and the L.D.S. Church which is vacant and which is
unusable for the construction of any residential improvements
due to the narrowness of its width and the lack of access to
it.
Since there is no one else who would have any motive to
make Hobble Creek safe for the nearby children, the duty
should fall upon defendant Biesinger who brought the children
near to the danger in the first place because of his profit
motive.
Realizing that he had a duty to protect the children from
the adJacent danger, defendant Biesinger erected a fence and
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gate.

Having undertaken the duty, and having represented that

he had made the premises safe,

he should have the liability

for his negligence in the maintenance of the fence.

To allnw

summary judgment in favor of defendant Biesinger would open an
avenue for nonliability for all landlords whose land is in
close proximity to a dangerous condition.

By deeding a small

strip of land bordering the danger to another entity or individual, or by refusing to purchase a narrow strip on the border,
a landlord would be able to insulate himself from all liability
merely by claiming that the dangerous condition is not on his
land.

The law should not allow a landlord to escape the duty

he owes to his tenants by removing his ownership interest a
short distance from the hazard, and then totally disregarding
any obligation that he otherwise would have incurred.
Public policy should require that when a businessman enters
into an activity for profit, and there is a known danger close
by, and there is an economical and feasible way to make it safe,
that he has a duty to make it safe.

Breach of that duty results

in liability.
POINT III

THERE ARE UNRESOLVED ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT
RELATING TO THE ACTS AND OMISSIONS OF
SPRINGVILLE IRRIGATION COMPANY AND DEFENDANT
SPRINGVILLE IRRIGATION COMPANY IS NOT ENTITLED
TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.
A.

There Is A Genuine Issue As To Whether The Defendant

Maintained A Condition Which Posed An Unreasonable Risk To
Children, And Was Negligent In The Protection Of The Diversion
Access.
-17-

Springville irrigation Company exercised dominion and
control over Swensen Dam and the diversion structures located
adjacent to the apartment complex.
The irrigation company did not own the land where the
diversion was made, but it had the right of diversion, and the
rights of ingress and egress to the point of diversion.

It

also had the right to construct a dam in the streambed.
Although it denied the right to control water released downstream from the dam, Hobble Creek was used as an overflow
system to release unwanted or unused irrigation water.

These

rights do not rise to the level of fee ownership, but they are
possessory interests in the land.
The dam across the stream was an artificial condition
which was attractive to children.

When asked whether children

were seen going over Swenson Dam in the summer, the watermaster, Hardy LeRoy Child,
the children were there •

indicated in his deposition that
. every day of • • . the summer.

I'm scared some days to go up there."
31)

(Depo. ofHardy

Child p.

A child of Jonathan's age would be attracted to the

tumbling waters of the diversion dam without a realization of
the danger to him.

The irrigation company knew that children

were attracted to the dam because the children were seen there
throughout the summer and the irrigation company also knew
that the diversion work posed an unreasonable risk of bodily
harm, evidenced by the watermaster's fear of the children
playing there.

Utah has been reluctant to apply the "attrac-

tive nuisance" doctrine to canals because of the massive
-18-
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place for young chilrlren in a residential neighborhood, anrl
fails to exercise care in rlenying access to the diversion when
the single location could easily he fenced and controlled,
they have failed to exercise reasonable care to eliminate the
danger and protect the children.

Utah case law supports

liability where structures which create an unreasonable risk
of injury are placed in a streambed.

Brown v. Salt Lake City,

93 P. 570 (Utah 1908).
B.

Even Where The Courts Have Been Reluctant To Apply

The Attractive Nuisance Doctrine, Relief Has Been Granted On
Theories Of Common Law Negligence.
In Partin v. Olney,

591 P. 2d 74 (Ariz. App.

1978),

two

small boys were playing in an irrigation ditch, and had been
seen by an irrigation company official who failed to warn them
of the unforeseen hazards.
drowned in the canal.

The next day one of the boys

The court said that where an agent of

the company knows of the presence of children and the danger
to them,

and fails to take any action to remove the children,

he has acted in reckless disregard of the safety of the
ren.

If the agent acts recklessly in the course of his emplc1

ment,

the attractive nuisance immunity for irr1gat1cn canals

would not

the :rr1g3t10n

The Spr1ngv1lle :rr:.gat1\'·n

·,.;3ter"l2Stt-'r-

a

tr

rem,>ve the ·:hil<Jr,,11 tr«rn the diversion work when he knew that
they f•layP<i at the dam site and the diversion water posed an
unreasonable risk to them.

The irrigation company also had a

duty to restrict access to the diversion works.
negligent breach of its duty,

Through the

the Springville Irrigation

Company is liable under a negligence cause of action.
C.

There Is A Genuine Issue Of Fact As To Where The

Plaintiff, Jonathan Weber,

Fell Into Hobble Creek.

Despite the fact that no one actually saw Jonathan fall
into Hobble Creek there are several reasons why Jonathan may
have fallen

in at or near the irrigation diversion.

1)

The

700 East crossing and the Swenson Dam are the stream access
points nearest the apartment the Webers were moving into.
The time within which the accident occurred supports the conclusion that Jonathan could have fallen
works.

in at the diversion

2) Swenson Dam is the most easily entered stream

access point on the south side of the creek.

Jonathan could

have easily proceeded to the diversion location,

fallen in,

and could have been swept to where he was retrieved in 30
second feet of water, which was the approximate stream flow
below the diversion when the accident occurred.
Hardy LeRoy Child,

p.

6,

9)

3)

(De po. of

For Jonathan to have fallen

into the stream through access at the extreme west end of the
building,
building.

he would have had to walk the entire length of the
Then he would have had to turn north, walk past the

garbage receptacles,

across the backyard, past the dogs of

""ruch he ·..ias fearful

(Depo.

of Don Weber p.

-20-

48,

53,

54), go

through an opening in the fence and t1nally cross a large sandy
area before he reached the stream hank.
p.

49-56)

(Depo. of Don Weber

This route is particularly long with many more oh-

stacles than the 700 East crossing near the diversion works.
4)

In looking for Jonathan, Donald picked a logical path that

a young child would follow.

He first glanced south across the

parking lot to an open area, hoping the child would be there.
He then proceeded east, around the eastern end of the building
to where he could see the 700 East crossing and Swenson Dam
area.

(Depo. of Don Weber p.

59) After discovering that the

boy was not on the banks to the east, Donald searched the backyard, and did not proceed to the western end of the building
and north to the streambed until the previously mentioned areas
had been searched.

(Depa. of Donald Weber p. 20-23).

The child

was found approximately 10 minutes after he was missed at 300
South and 400 East Street approximately 3000 feet from the
apartment house.

POINT IV

SPRINGVILLE CITY OWED A DUTY OF CARE
TO THE PLAINTIFFS ARISING OUT OF 1) CITY
ORDINANCES AND 2) THE VOLUNTARY
ASSUMPTION OF A DUTY.
The duty of Springville City to the plaintiffs arises by
1) City Ordinances, and 2) By voluntary assumption.

The City

has enacted an ordinance which states:
"It shall be unlawful to cause, create,
maintain or be the author of an attractive
nuisance within the city.
Any vacant lot
or open area of ground into which the public,
and particularly children, has access within
which any of the following conditions occur
is an attractive nuisance: (1) Ponding or
impounding of water ..• (Springville City
Ordinances §12-2-4, R. 431, Appendix "A". l
-21-

Plaintiff, in the above statement of facts, has pointed
to several arlmitted practices on the part of the city, which
at the very least, present a material issue of fact as to
whether the city has caused, created, maintained or been the
author of an attractive nuisance under its own definition.
There is a material issue of fact as to whether the conditions
of Hobble Creek, Swensen Dam and related structures constitute
the ponding or impounding of water.
Springville City assumed the responsibility of making safe
the buildings constructed within its boundaries.
permits for that purpose.

It issued

It also required that no building

permit be issued for any property crossed or fronted by an
irrigation ditch unless the ditch was covered or would be
covered by the proposed construction.

Springville City also

assumed responsibility for the upkeep of Hobble Creek to protect its citizenry from the water hazard.
When a governmental entity takes upon itself the responsibility of caring for its citizenry affirmatively, it assumes
the position of a "good samaritan" and is liable for its negligence.

This principle was espoused in Barnson, et al. v.

United States, 531 F.supp. 614(D.C. Utah 1982).

In that case,

the plaintiffs alleged, among other causes of action, a cause
of action for negligent inspection.

The defendant moved for

summary judgment but the motion was denied on the following
basis:

-22-

Plaintiff's principle legal argument supporting these claims is that defendant is
liable on a "good samaritan" theory, based
on Restatement (Second) of Torts, Sections
323 and 324A (1965).
Section 323 postulates liability for one who undertakes to
render services to another which he should
recognize as necessary to protect the
other, and fails to exercise reasonable
care in performing that undertaking, so
that either the risk of harm to the other
is increased or the harm is suffered
because the other relied on the undertaking.
Section 324A similarly defines
liability when one undertakes to perform
services for another with the same result,
but necessary for the protection of a
third person.
In addition, Section 324A
permits liability where the undertaking is
a duty owed by the other to the third
person.
While the Utah Supreme Court has apparently
never addressed or adopted the "good
samaritan" doctrine, this court is of the
opinion that it will adopt it when it is
presented with the theory and appropriate
facts.
The court specifically notes that
the Utah legislature has passed a statute
exempting from liability medical practitioners who render emergency aid in good
faith.
See Utah Code Ann. §58-12-23(1974).
This statute appears to anticipate a "good
samaritan" theory of liability, much as
the Utah Products Liability Act, Utah Code
Ann. §78-15-1 to 6(1977), anticipated the
Utah court's later adoption of §402A of
the restatement, which adoption was
predicted four times under the Erie
doctrine by this circuit (citations
omitted).
531 F.Supp. 621.
A case cited in Barnson, above, sheds additional light on
the duty imposed on a governmental entity when it assumes a
responsibility over inspections, licensing, and certification.
United Scottish Ins. Co. v. United States, 614 F.2d 188 (9th
Cir. 1980) involved a suit against the federal government for
failure to properly inspect an airplane under federal regula-23-

tions.

In allowing suit against the federal government the

9th Circuit said:
The FAA in inspecting and certifying the
aircraft for air worthiness, was rendering a service for others, rather than performing regulatory duties, and thus came
within the "good samaritan" doctrine formulated in Restatement (Second) of Torts;
the basis of the claim against the government being the negligence of the administration's inspection in which the air
worthiness certificate was issued. The
court further held that the FAA regulation
of the airline industry in its inspection
of aircraft were not discretionary functions for the purpose of the Tort Claims
Act.
To the extent that the government is
arguing that because "inspection and
certification" of aircraft is a uniquely
governmental function, liability may not
be predicated upon misfeasance in such
activity the government is plainly wrong
(citations omitted). 614 F.2d 192.
The defendant Springville City is a "good samaritan" under
the Barnson case.

It assumed a duty to the plaintiffs to pro-

tect them from Hobble Creek floodwaters.

It breached its duty

when it 1) failed to impose adequate requirements as a condition
of issuing a building permit, ie. fencing,
protection; and

covering or other

2) Created and maintained a dangerous condition,

eg. the retaining wall which guides a fast flowing floodstage
stream.
p.

(More than 30 c.f.s., R. 567, depo. Hardy LeRoy Child,

6).

POINT V
SPRINGVILLE CITY AND SPRINGVILLE IRRIGATION
ARE JOINT TORTFEASORS IN MAINTAINING AN
ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE WITHIN THE CITY LIMITS
Springville City and Springville Irrigation Company, in
contesting that Hobble Creek was not an attractive nuisance,
-24-

have relied on the common law developed hy the courts at the
turn of the century.

To begin with,

this common law has been

superceded by Springville City Ordinance §12-2-4 which defines
the "ponding or impounding of water" as an attractive nuisance,
and prohibits such ponding when children and the public have
access to the area.

The city and the irrigation company have

violated the ordinance by building and maintaining Swensen
Darn, and the structures surrounding it without necessary protection for the public.
device.

A darn, by definition,

is an impounding

The city cannot say that the irnpoundment is not an

attractive nuisance, when it has affirmatively defined an
attractive nuisance to include such physical impoundments of
water.

Even in the absence of the statutory definition, the

common law development of the attractive nuisance doctrine with
respect to irrigation streams has changed over the years.
cases of Chavoz v. Salt Lake City, 131 P.

901

The

(Utah 1913), and

Sallady v. Old Dominion Copper Mining Co., 100 P. 441

(Ariz. 1909

cited by the defendant in its Memorandum in Support of its
Motion for Summary Judgment were early hardline developments
in protecting irrigation companies from liability as an
economic necessity;

however, this hard line doctrine has been

softened in subsequent cases.

In a recent Utah case,

Brinkerhoff v. Salt Lake City, 371 P.2d 211 (Utah 1962), the
Utah Supreme Court held that an irrigation canal was not an
attractive nuisance and that Salt Lake City was not liable for
the drowning of a child because of failure to fence the canal;
however, the ruling was decided by a narrow 3 to 2 vote, and a
-25-

strong dissent was written regarding the negligent mainenance
of an artificial condition which poses an unreasonable risk to
small children.
The Arizona courts have radically changed their position
since Sallady, supra.
1008,

In Marble v. Parham, 416 P.2d 1006,

(Ariz. App. 1966), the Arizona Court said:
We are impressed with the humanitary trend
in favor of the child which lessens the
impact of.
• Sallady.
416 P.2d 1008.
In a later case, Harris v. Buckeye Irrigation Co., 578

P.2d 177 (Ariz. 1978), a suit was brought against the irrigation company after a 12 year old boy allegedly fell into the
irrigation canal while riding a bicycle over a bridge that
crossed the canal.

The trial judge granted the defendant's

motion for summary judgment, but the Arizona Supreme Court
reversed and remanded the case to the trial court saying:
The defendant placed a bridge at a point
where it could be anticipated that the
public would use it to cross the canal ••.
. it could be reasonably expected that
children, as well as adults, would use
this bridge. The defendant also had ample
notice of the fact that the bridge was
potentially dangerous.
The bridge was in
fact, open to the public generally and the
defendants did nothing either to restrict
the use of the bridge by the public or to
make it safe for the persons they knew
were using the bridge.
The immunity given to irrigation districts
in Sallady, supra, was based in sound
public policy at the time .•• unfortunately,
this immunity sometimes leads to the
callous "public be damned" policy •••• " 578
P.2d at 180.
In the instant case Springville City maintains a bridge
-26-

over the stream with a footpath alongside.

It also has

helped to maintain the diversion structures in and about
Swensen Dam.

The present status of the law disfavors denying

a plaintiff recovery under the attractive nuisance doctrine
where a child has been injured by an irrigation stream.
Springville City and Springville Irrigation Company should not
be excused from liability relying on an outdated doctrine,
particularly where they have affirmatively defined the
forbidden activity in which they have participated.

POINT VI
THE INABILITY OF THE PLAINTIFFS TO PINPOINT THE
EXACT LOCATION WHERE JONATHAN WEBER ENTERED
HOBBLE CREEK DOES NOT FORECLOSE ACTION
AGAINST SPRINGVILLE CITY OR
SPRINGVILLE IRRIGATION COMPANY
Springville City had control over the entire length of
Hobble Creek.

Springville City and Springville Irrigation

Company exercised substantial control over the pertinent
portion of the Hobble Creek streambed
structures thereon.

and the artificial

The city repaired concrete retaining

walls and bridges, shored up the banks and dredged the
streambed when it felt it was necessary to channel the stream.
A determination of the exact location where Jonathan
Weber fell into Hobble Creek is admittedly not possible.

No

person was present when he entered the stream, and he is not
mentally able to recount the incident, however,

the observa-

tions of Don Weber, Winona Weber, Wayne Wing and Inga Wing,
together with the timing of the event and the limitations of
a two and one half year old child all provide sufficient
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evidence to show the approximate location of Jonathan's entry
into the stream.
Springville City had assumed control over the entire
stream and their liability is commensurate therewith.
Although certain portions of Hobble Creek may not have been
disturbed,

the city had assumed an interest in the maintenance

of the entire stream, and is responsible for consequences
resulting from such actions.

POINT VII
DUE TO THE DOCTRINE OF JOINT LIABILITY
ALL DEFENDANTS ARE STILL LIABLE FOR THEIR
NEGLIGENCE DESPITE PLAINTIFF'S INABILITY TO
PROVE THE EXACT LOCATION OF THE INJURY.
In the landmark case of Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal.2d 80,
199 P.2d 1 (1948), three hunters, the plaintiff and two
defendants, were hunting quail together.

The plaintiff became

separated from the defendants, and while waiting for them to
come towards him, some quail flew up, and the defendants both
shot at the quail.

Pellets from one of the defendants' shots

struck the plaintiff in the eye and in the lip.

The plaintiff

brought suit against the defendants for negligence, but could
not prove which of the defendants shot the pellets which
actually injured him.

Despite the impossibility of this proof,

the trial court found both defendants liable.

This decision

was appealed to the California Supreme Court which affirmed
the trial court saying:
Dean Whitmore has this to say: "When two
or more persons by their acts are possibly
the sole cause of the harm, and when two
or more acts of the same person are
-28-

possibly the sole cause, and the plaintiff
has introduced evidence that thP one of
the two persons, or the one ot the same
persons' two acts, is culpable, then the
defendant has the burden of proving that
the other person or his other act was the
sole cause of harm (b).
.The real reason
for the rule that each joint tortfeasor is
responsible for the whole damage is the
practicle unfairness of denying the injured
person redress simply because he cannot
prove how much damage each did, when it is
certain that between them they did all;
let them be the ones to appoi:t ion among
themselves.

*

*

*

*

When we consider the i:elative position of
the parties and the results that would
flow if the plaintiff were requii:ed to pin
the injury on one of the defendants only,
a requii:ement that the burden of pi:oof on
that subject be shifted to defendants
becomes manifest.
They are both wrongdoers-both negligent towards the plaintiff.
They
brought about a situation where the negligence of one of them injured the plaintiff,
hence it should rest with them each to
absolve himself if he can.
The injui:ed
party has been placed by defendants in the
unfair position of pointing to which defendant caused the harm.
If one can escape,
the other may also and plaintiff is
remediless.
199 P.2d at 3-4.
The Summers court relied heavily upon an earlier Mississippi
decision, Oliver v. Miles,

110 So.

the facts of which parallelled

666 (Miss.

Summers,

1926).

the Mississippi court

held:
"We think that ... each (defendant) is liable
for the resulting injury to the boy, although no one can say definately who
actually shot him.
To hold otherwise
would be to exonerate both from liability,
although each was negligent and the inJury
i:esulted from such negligence.
110 So.
Page 668.
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In Oliver,

One of the latest discussions of this theory of joint
liability is contained in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 163
Cal. Rptr.

132, 607 P.2d 924 (1980).

In that case, a woman

had contracted cancer of the bladder because of the drug
called DES which her mother had taken during pregnancy.

The

plaintiff's injuries did not surface until some 20 to 30 years
after the drug had been ingested.

The drug had also been pro-

duced by approximately 200 drug manufacturers.

The defendants

in this case demurred to the complaint, and the trial court
sustained the demurrer on the grounds that the plaintiff could
not identify which defendant had manufactured the drug responsible for her injuries.

The California Supreme Court reversed

the decision of the trial court, and developed a hybrid of the
Summers, doctrine in holding the defendants liable:
"The most persuasive reason for finding
plaintiff states a cause of action is that
advanced in Summers; as between an innocent
plaintiff and negligent defendants, the
latter should bear the cost of the injury.
Here, as in Summers, plaintiff is not at
fault in failing to provide evidence of
causation and although the absence of such
evidence is not attributable to the defendants either, their conduct in marketing a
drug the effects of which are delayed for
many years played a significant role in
creating the unavailability of proof.
From a broader policy standpoint, defendants are better able to bear the cost of
injury resulting from the manufacture of a
defective product.
607 P.2d 936.
The principles enunciated in the above cited cases are
directly applicable to the present case.

Each of the named

defendants owed a duty to the plaintiff.

Defendant Springville
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City should have required that a safe fence be erected as a
condition to receiving a building permit.
the building of Swensen Dam,

Having permitted

the city should have required

that adequate precautions be taken,

ie.

fencing,

to protect

against what the city ordinance defines as an attractive
nuisance.

Finally, having undertaken to improve, maintain,

and alter the condition of Hobble Creek, by building
retaining walls,

replacing diversion structures, and dredging

and clearing debris, the city voluntarily assumed the duty to
make Hobble Creek safe.

The defendant Springville City

breached its duty.
Springville Irrigation Company created an attractive
nuisance.

Children played at Swensen Dam all summer, and the

agents of the defendant were fearful for the safety of the
children, yet they did nothing about it.

Springville Irriga-

tion Company had control of the flow of water down Hobble
Creek to the extent that sometimes there was no water below
Swensen dam, and when there was water in Hobble Creek it was
the overflow of the irrigation system.

Having materially

altered the nature of Hobble Creek, and having created an
attractive nuisance,

the defendant Springville Irrigation

Company owed a duty to plaintiffs which they breached.
Defendant Biesinger made representations to plaintiffs
upon which they relied in entering into a contract with
defendant.

Defendant contractually undertook to keep the

apartment building safe by maintaining the fence which he
represented inhibited access to Hobble Creek.
- 31-

He maintained

control over the common area of the apartments but allowed a
condition to develop that posed a risk of harm to small
children.

Futher, having undertaken to fence against the

dangerous running water behind his property, his negligent
abandonment of the maintenance of the fence was a breach of
his duty.

Each of the defendants were negligent and as

between the plaintiff and the negligent defendants, the latter
should bear the cost of injury.
CONCLUSION
Defendant Biesinger clearly owed a duty to his tenants to
maintain the common area in a safe condition for the use of
his tenants.

He acknowledged that duty by building a fence,

and then repesented through his agents that the area was safe.
He breached his duty by failing to maintain the fence and gate
and the injuries to plaintiff Jonathan Weber were proximately
caused by the negligence of defendant Biesinger.
Defendant Biesinger also contractually assumed a duty to
prevent access by small children to Hobble Creek by providing
and maintaining an adequate fence.

He breached his contractual

obligation and the injuries to Jonathan Weber were foreseeable.
The defendant is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law
because there are material issues in question, and his motion
for summary judgment should have been denied.
Defendant Springville Irrigation District created an
attractive nuisance and altered the nature of Hobble Creek.
It breached its duty to plaintiff and is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law because there are material issues in
-32-

question and defendant's motion for summary Judgment should
have been denied.
The defendant Springville City owed a duty to Jonathan
Weber to guard against the attractive nuisance and hazardous
condition present as a result of actions by Springville city
and others whom it had power to control.

While the duty of

Springiville City may be partially a voluntarily assumed duty,
it is still required to comport with the standard of due care.
The question as to the precise point of entry into Hobble
Creek by Jonathan Weber is not dispositive in the present case;
therefore the defendants' motions for summary judgment should
have been denied.

Plaintiffs respectfully ask the court to

reverse the orders of the Fourth Judicial District court of
Utah County granting defendants' motions for summary judgment
and to remend the case for trial.
DATED this

11.

day of December,

1983.

HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
MAILED two copies of the foregoing to Mr. Harold D. Mitchell,
Strong
Utah,

&

Mitchell,

84663; Mr.

197 South Main, P.O. Box 124, Springville,

Don R. Strong, Strong

&

Mitchell, 197 South Main,

Springville, Utah, 84663; Mr. Tim Dalton Dunn, Hanson, Russon,
Hanson

&

Dunn, 650 Clark-Learning Office Center,

175 South West

Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101; and Mr. Darwin C. Hansen,
110 West Center Street, Bountiful, Utah, 84010; postage prepaid,
this ± d a y of December, 1983.
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10-1-4: Irrigation Ditches. No building permit shall be issued for any
property \\li1ch is cro,,ed by or fronted by an irrigation ditch, unless
the plans anJ "IPt'l:l flCJllOll\ for the COll.\lruction to be Jl.'.COmplished
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CHAPTER 2

PLUMBING CODE
10-2-1: Utah Plumhing Code Adopted. The Utah Plumbing Code 3'
published by the Utah S1ate Board of Health, 1974 Edition, is hereby
adopted as the C11y Plumbing Code. The 1ame is adopted, with the
modification> 'el forth 1n 1hi> Title, as if fully set fonh herein. The City Recorder shall maintain a1 le31l three copies of 1aid plumbing code
in h1' office for u'e and ir1'pectton bv the public as required by stale
la" It 11iall be unla\\ ful 10 1n11all, alter or repair any plumbing in the
City 1n vil1l:.it1()n of, 1H \\.Hhou1 l.'.llmrhing \\Ith, "uch plumbing
t'111k ;:ltl: I .1, .1111-:1tJl·d h\ \lrd111.in .. c· ....,,1

. ..1rnenJl·J

CHAPTER 3

ELECTRICAL CODE
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